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Abstract
We examine the choice of quotas by legal volume-restricting organizations: do-
mestic and international cartels, commodity organizations, U. S. Federal agricul-
tural marketing boards, and prorationing boards. Unlike their illegal counterparts,
legal cartels have published regulations and broader enforcement capabilities. Dif-
ferences in costs and size among cartel members, however, still make quota selec-
tion contentious. Conflicts over quotas are typically resolved by voting. Cartel
regulations usually require that quotas be chosen in the following manner: a scalar
(depending on context capacity, inventory, historical output or historical exports)
is assigned to each entity subject to regulation. Cartel members then vote on the
common percentage of each scalar which is the maximum the entity may sell. Side-
payments to influence votes are prohibited. We examine the predicted effects of
this real-world institution on prices and welfare and compare the equilibrium out-
comes to what would occur if joint profits were instead maximized. We also show
the economic consequences of exogenous political changes such as alterations in the
voting weights or in the identity of the voters.
1. Introduction
The recent literature on cartels has focussed on how production quotas can be
enforced. Enforcement is particularly tricky when the cartel is illegal since the
machinery of government is then unavailable to penalize cheating. It has been
shown that the credible threat of price wars in the future in response to cheating,
observed directly or rationally inferred, can be sufficient to deter quota violations
even if such behavior would garner substantial profits in the short run.1
We focus here on a different aspect of cartels: their choice of production quotas
by voting. We limit ourselves to legal cartels. Enforcement is often a secondary
problem for such cartels since the machinery of government can be used to punish
cheating. Their primary problem is to resolve often fierce internal conflicts and to
choose collectively a compromise set of quotas.2
As their published regulations reflect, legal cartels almost invariably choose quo-
tas in the following manner: a scalar (for example capacity, inventory, historical
output or historical exports) is assigned to each entity subject to regulation. Cartel
members then vote on the common percentage of each scalar which is the maxi-
mum the entity may sell. Sidepayments to influence the votes of cartel members
are prohibited.
Many domestic cartels, international cartels, agricultural marketing boards, and
prorationing boards governing common properties choose quotas in this manner. A
few examples spanning different epochs and continents will illustrate the diverse
circumstances in which this institution arises.
Domestic Cartels The Japanese Cotton Textile Association (Dai Nippon B6seki
Rengokai) regulated every firm in the cotton-spinning industry in Japan during the
late 19th and early 20th century (until 1940). According to Shoji [1930], every firm
was assigned a benchmark capacity and was allowed to produce up to a common
fraction of that capacity. No trading was permitted in unused capacity. Enforce-
ment was effective.3 The common fraction was chosen by majority rule. Every
regulated firm voted and each vote received equal weight. Although all Japanese
spinners were regulated, rival producers in other countries constituted an unregu-
lated sector.
International Cartels The International Rubber Regulation Agreement signed
in 1934 by the United Kingdom, India, the Netherlands, France and Siam, fixed ba-
sic quotas for each member country. The International Rubber Regulation Commit-
'For a review of this literature, see Chapter 6 of Tirole [1988].
2 For a similar assessment of legal cartels, see Porter [1991, p. 559].
3After the common fraction of benchmark capacity was decided, officials from the Textile Asso-
ciation visited each firm and sealed spindles to prevent production beyond the legal limit. Other
safeguards were taken. Since production could not occur without imported cotton and imported
cotton came via shipping lanes controlled by a confederate cartel, the Textile Association entered
into agreements with the shipping cartel to regulate and monitor imports of raw cotton. All told, the
Japanese Cotton Textile Association was able to closely monitor the employment, wages, imported
inputs and output of each of each Japanese spinning firm to insure compliance.
1
tee determined a uniform percentage of the basic quotas which could be exported.4
The "Sugar Cartel" which regulated 90% of world sugar production before the sec-
ond world war and the ongoing International Coffee Organization which regulates
all but a handful of small coffee exporters reflect this same structure. In each of
these cases, voters are government officials and countries with larger basic quotas
have more votes.5
Agricultural Marketing Boards The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937
permits growers and handlers of fruits, vegetables, and tree nuts grown in the U.S.
to form cartels. If an allocation or prorate scheme is adopted, each handler in a
designated geographical region must report the inventory he has under contract
(the analog to the basic quota's of the international cartels). An administrative
committee then votes by majority rule on the common maximum fraction of each
handler's inventory which may be sold on the "primary" market. The remaining
inventory may be sold only in unregulated outlets. Only a small subset of the
regulated handlers are members of the administrative committee. Monitoring is
strict and cheating, a violation of federal law, is rare. Foreign firms and domestic
firms outside the regulated area comprise an unregulated sector.
Prorationing Boards Governing Common Properties The Texas Railroad
Commission (and counterpart regulatory commissions in Louisiana, Oklahoma, New
Mexico, and Kansas) regulate oil extraction within the state. A "yardstick" capac-
ity is assigned to each well (the analog of the "basic quota") and the commission
sets a common percentage of the yardstick-the "market demand factor"- that
each well is permitted to produce during the month. Commission members choose
this percentage by majority rule. Members of the commission are government offi-
cials not market participants. In the past, when import restrictions protected the
domestic market, this regulation not only reduced congestion externalities but also
affected the domestic price. In the absence of import quotas, such prorationing
would not affect the price but still mitigates congestion externalities.
These volume-restricting organizations bear little resemblance to the standard
model of cartels in the economics literature.6 In particular, although all of these real-
world cartels select quotas by majority rule, no model in the literature incorporates
voting.7 Our goal in this research is to determine whether it is always appropriate
4 For a tabulation of the "basic quota" of each member country and the common percentage which
could be exported from 1934-1943, see Table VII and VIII of Knorr [1945].
'For a discussion of the distribution of votes in the Sugar Council, see Stocking and Watkins, p.
45. For a discussion of the distribution of votes in the International Coffee Organization, see Bates
and Lien [1985] and Schrag [1986].
6Despite the mismatch between the received model and the real-world institution, these diverse
organizations are typically referred to as cartels. For example, Varian [1990, p.458] refers to agri-
cultural marketing boards as cartels and Blair [1976, Ch. 7] regards prorationing boards as cartels.
As for the sugar and rubber agreements, in the opinion of the expert retained by the Temporary
National Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress in its investigations of cartels ". .. it would be
difficult to find a foreign observer that would not call either the sugar or rubber agreement a cartel."
[TNEC, p. 13066].
7The only exception is our own preliminary paper [Cave and Salant, 1987], which is limited to
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to abstract from the voting aspect of cartels. It is our conclusion that sensible
predictions about prices in markets with legal cartels cannot be made without con-
sidering the political aspects of quota selection. As has long been appreciated,
members of cartels with larger capacities or higher costs want tighter quotas than
members with smaller capacities or lower costs.8 This insight is often mentioned in
informal discussions of internal conflicts in cartels. It is precisely these two factors
of cost and capacity that-in the absence of sidepayments- influence the voting
on quotas. As we show, the compromises reached under majority rule need not be
profit-maximizing.
In the next section, we describe the economic equilibria that would arise in
response to alternative quotas. We assume that each cartel member foresees the
profit consequences of alternative quotas and votes to maximize his subsequent
profits. We show that-for any given committee of voters and voting weights-one
quota is always preferred by a majority of the voters to any other; moreover, we
show how exogenous political changes in the identity of the voters or how their votes
are weighted will affect the market price. Section 3 compares the price predicted in
our model to the price which would arise if the quota maximized profits. Section 4
concludes the paper.
the special case of agricultural marketing boards where marginal costs are identical and hence all
constrained firms must completely agree about which of two binding quotas is the more profitable.
8See, for example, Chapter 13 of Stigler [1966].
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2. The Model
Consider an industry of n firms that simultaneously choose outputs and produce
perfect substitutes. We assume initially that all firms are regulated by a cartel.
Associated with firm i is a firm-specific scalar (q;) used to translate the cartel's
prior choice (F) into restrictions on that particular firm. If the cartel chooses the
quota F, then firm i's output (denoted y2) must not exceed Fq;.
Firm i is assumed to produce at constant marginal cost c; and to incur no fixed
cost. Index the firms in order of ascending marginal cost. If two firms have the
same marginal cost, index them in order of increasing capacity. That is, set i < j
if (a) c; <c3 or (b) c2 = c3 and qj<9.9
Denote aggregate output as Y(= i yi) and the induced price as P(Y). Firm i
wishes to
max y;[P(y+Y_;) -c ] (1)
0<yi <Fqi
where Y_, = Y - y1. At a Cournot equilibrium, each firm's choice maximizes
its payoff given the choices of the other firms. The equilibrium profits of each
firm will depend on the cartel's prior choice F. We refer to such profit functions
as "induced preferences" (denoted ir(F)) since they determine the preferences of
market participants over alternative quotas.
The reader should note that our formulation is sufficiently general to encom-
pass each of the cases discussed in the introduction-not merely domestic and
international10 cartels but also prorationing boards and agricultural marketing boards."
As discussed in the introduction, these volume-restricting organizations have in the
past based their quotas on a wide variety of firm-specific scalars. For simplicity,
we refer to qi as "capacity" and the volume-restricting organization as a "producer
cartel" until the next section when welfare comparisons require us to distinguish
the case with congestion externalities.
Assume that the inverse demand curve is strictly decreasing and twice con-
tinuously differentiable. In addition, assume that the Novshek condition holds.'2
'If the firms are identical in both respects, arbitrarily assign them successive indices.
10The model applies to international cartels if each country is assumed to contain a single firm
(or, alternatively, a collection of identical firms) and if the voters representing each country are
assumed to reflect the interests of its firm. While admittedly imperfect, this seems like a useful first
approximation that abstracts from the way the country quota is allocated internally and from the
incentives of elected representatives who are not market participants.
1 In the case of an agricultural marketing board, handler i would maximize yP(y-i+Y-i)+(qi-yi)c,
subject to 0 < y, < Fq; where P(-) is the volume-sensitive price in the primary market and c is the
exogenous price in the secondary market. To obtain this from (1), simply add to (1) the constant
term cq,. In the case of a prorationing board, extractor i would maxy (P - A(y: + Y.-i)) subject to
0 y<iFi, where P is the exogenously fixed price of the resource and A(Y) is the average cost
of extraction on the particular field due to a congestion externality. To obtain this from (1), replace
the positive, decreasing function P(Y) in (1) by the positive, decreasing function c + P - A(Y).
'2The Novshek condition is that P'(Y) + YP"(Y) < 0 for all Y > 0. In the appendices, we
dispense with this condition and require only that the total revenue function be concave in aggregate
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Finally, assume that there would be positive demand if the lowest cost firm pro-
duced at cost (D(ci) > 0) and that demand disappears at sufficiently high prices
(limp. D(P) = 0). Given these assumptions, there exists a unique Cournot equi-
librium in pure strategies induced by a given quota F.13 This equilibrium is char-
acterized by an aggregate output (Y) divided into a vector of outputs (yi,... , yn)
satisfying one of the following conditions for i = 1, . .. , n
production.
13For a proof, see Appendix I.
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Inactive y= = 0 and P(Y) - c; <0 (2a)
Unconstrained 0 < y; < q;F and P(Y) + y;P'(Y) - c; = 0 (2b)
Constrained y; = q;F and P(Y) + qFP'(Y) - c; > 0. (2c)
Consider the Cournot equilibrium in the output market induced by F. Denote by
Y(F) the aggregate equilibrium production induced by F. Denote the quota which
would just bind on firm j as Fj. Then F is implicitly defined as follows:
P (Y(F,)) + qFjP'(Y(Fj)) -cj = 0. (3)
We refer to F, as j's "cutoff."' 4
Suppose the following regularity condition holds for each pair of firms i and j
such that i <j:
P'(Y(F )) Fj(q, - qi) cj - ci. (4)
Then any quota binding on one firm must also bind on all firms with smaller
indices. For suppose the quota F is just binding on firm j. Consider some firm i
where i < j. Subtracting (4) from (3), we obtain:
P (Y(F,)) + q;FjP' (Y(F,)) - c > 0. (5)
Hence, firm i would also be constrained at this quota. The cutoffs are therefore
"nested":
F K _... < F2 < F1.
The regularity condition (4) admits many cases of interest. It holds if two firms
have equal marginal costs or if they have unequal marginal costs but the capacity
of the firm with the smaller marginal cost is not too much larger than the firm with
the larger marginal cost.15 The regularity condition is necessary and sufficient for
the cutoffs to be nested and, as shown below, is sufficient but not necessary for the
existence of a Condorcet quota.16
When cutoffs are nested, the induced preferences display a property we refer to
as "partial agreement." For any two firms i and j such that i < j and any pair of
quotas F and F such that F < F < F < F:
IfF>;-1 FthenF>-,F; (6)
If F>-, Fthen F-- 1 F. (7)
14As shown in Appendix II, each cutoff is unique.
isFor example, suppose demand is linear and the slope has the magnitude m. If c, < c5 but
qi qi + (c, - ci)/m, then the regularity condition will still hold.
16A Condorcet quota (F) is one which a majority of the voters prefers to any alternative. To see
that the regularity condition is not necessary for existence, suppose every firm but one is identical
and the final firm's cost and capacity violate the regularity condition. The common ideal point of
the identical firms will still be the Gondorcet quota.
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That is, if the firm with the larger cutoff strictly prefers the smaller quota then
so must the firm with the smaller cutoff; reciprocally, if the firm with the smaller
cutoff strictly prefers the larger quota then so must the firm with the larger cutoff.
The agreement in preference is said to be "partial" rather than "complete" since no
restrictions are placed on the preferences if the firm with the larger cutoff prefers
the larger quota or, alternatively, if the firm with the smaller cutoff prefers the
smaller quota.'7
To verify (6), note that since F >.. F, we have
fqi (P (Y(f)) - ci > Fqi (P (Y(F)) - ci). (8)
Note also that since c1 < c3 and F < F
- F(c3 - c) ;> -F(c, - ci). (9)
Dividing (8) by qj, adding (9), and multiplying the result by q3 we obtain:
q (P (Y(f)) - c3) > Fq (P (Y(F)) - c-), (10)
which confirms that F }- F.
To verify (7), note that since F >.- F, we have
Fq3 (P(Y(F)) - c;) > fq3 (P (Y(f)) - c ). (11)
Dividing (11) by q, adding (9), and multiplying the result by qj we obtain:
Fqi (P (Y(F)) - ci) > fq, (P (Y(f)) -ci (12)
which confirms that F >-i F.
In addition to nesting and partial agreement, the preferences display two other
noteworthy characteristics. First, 7r=(F) is a continuous function. Moreover, if firm i
is unconstrained and at least one firm is constrained (F F F1), then i's induced
preference (7r;(F)) is strictly decreasing in F. We refer to these two properties
as "continuity" and "unconstrained monotonicity" of the induced preferences.18
Unconstrained monotonicity is intuitively plausible since a reduction in a quota
binding only on one's rivals shifts out the residual demand curve facing the firm.
Some readers may find it convenient to visualize geometrically the impact of
quotas on the Cournot equilibrium. We therefore conclude this subsection with a
graph which-although unorthodox- is useful in this (and many other) exercises
'7Firrms with identical marginal costs must rank the two quotas identically even in these cases.
Agreement is then said to be "complete." If firm i strictly prefers F to F and both quotas bind on
i then Fq;(P(Y(F) - c) > Fq;(P(Y(F) - c). Multiplying by the positive number g2/gi, we obtain
Fgq (P(Y (F) - c) > Fq,(P(Y(F) - c). Therefore, if both quotas also bind on firm j, firm j strictly
prefers F also. Gave and Salant [1987] is limited to this special case.
'8Proofs are relegated to Appendix II.
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with the Cournot model. Since P'(Y) = 1/D'(P(Y)), we can re-write the first order
conditions in (2a-2c) as follows:
( min(qF, -D'(P)(P - ci)) if Pi > c,
y; = (13)0notherwise
We refer to this function as firm i's pseudosupply curve. The prefix "pseudo" is
added to remind readers that the function would shift if the demand curve changed
and is therefore not a "true" supply curve.
Since each firm's first-order condition must hold at every Cournot equilibrium,
each firm must be on its pseudosupply curve at a Cournot equilibrium. Since
we assume that the Novshek condition holds, the second-order condition holds as
well.'9 . Furthermore, the Novshek condition implies that every pseudosupply curve
will be upward-sloping (where it is unconstrained). Each pseudosupply curve has
a vertical intercept at P = ci, is strictly increasing until y1 = q2F and is vertical
thereafter as illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 1.20 Given our assumptions, there
must exist a unique intersection of the demand curve and the horizontal sum of the
pseudosupply curves as illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
This intersection point is the only candidate for a Cournot equilibrium since aggre-
gate production must equal demand at every equilibrium. Since the second-order
condition of each firm is satisfied at this candidate solution, it must correspond to
one (or more) Cournot equilibria. If it corresponded to more than one Cournot
equilibrium, all would have to result in the same market price and aggregate pro-
duction. But since no pseudosupply function is ever horizontal, only one output
vector satisfies the first-order conditions for the given price. Hence, the Cournot
equilibrium is unique.
It is now straightforward to prove that a reduction in F must raise the Cournot
equilibrium price as long as at least one firm is constrained. For, if the price
remained fixed, demand would be unchanged. But at that price the supplies of
the firms producing the legal limit would be reduced while the supplies of the
other firms would be unchanged. Hence, demand would exceed pseudosupply at
the old equilibrium price and only a price increase could eliminate the imbalance.
"Differentiating D(P(Y)) = Y, we conclude that P'(Y) = 1/D'(P(Y)) and P"(Y) =
-D"(P(Y))/[D'(P(Y))]3 . We can use these equations to express the second-order condition
(2P'(Y) + y;P"(Y) < 0) and the Novshek condition (P'(Y) + YP"(Y) < 0) in terms of the de-
mand curve. The second-order condition becomes 2D'(P(Y)) + (P - ci)D"(P(Y)) < 0 while the
Novshek condition becomes D'(P(Y)) + (P - c,)D"(P(Y)) < 0 for all P and i = 1, ... n
2 0The regularity condition is satisfied in the case represented in Figure 1. Geometrically, the
regularity condition requires that any horizontal line crossing the vertical segment (the increasing
segment) of firm i's pseudosupply curve must cross the vertical segment (the increasing segment)
of the pseudosupply curves of firms with smaller (larger) indices. In addition, we note that as a
simplification we have drawn the rising segments of the pseudosupply functions in Figure 1 as linear;
this would be the case only if the demand curve were linear.
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Since each individual pseudosupply function is increasing, the reduction in F must
induce an increase in the output of each unconstrained firm. Since the contraction
in F increases firm i's average profit (P - ci) as well as its output (yj), its total
profit must increase-implying "unconstrained monotonicity." Since both factors
are continuous functions of F, profit must also be continuous in F. Finally, since
each firm's pseudosupply function is strictly increasing, a firm constrained at F will
also be constrained at any smaller quota; conversely, a firm unconstrained at F will
be unconstrained at any larger quota. Readers who prefer more conventional proofs
of these claims are directed to the appendices.
2..1 Existence of a Condorcet Quota
Having derived several properties of the induced preferences, we now ask what
quota (F) the cartel will select. We refer to a quota which would win a majority of
votes when paired against any alternative as a "Condorcet" winner. If a Condorcet
quota exists, we assume that it will be chosen under majority rule.2 1 The induced
preferences in our model are not single-peaked even in the simplest case where
demand is linear and costs are identical. Hence, the standard condition sufficient for
the existence of a Condorcet quota [Black, 1958] cannot be applied. Nonetheless,
the structure of the cartel problem insures that the induced preferences display
nesting of cutoffs, unconstrained monotonicity, partial agreement, and continuity.
These characteristics turn out to be sufficient for the existence of a Condorcet quota.
We first prove this assertion and then distinguish our result from other sufficiency
conditions in the collective choice literature.
Since ;ir(F) is continuous, there exists for each firm i an "ideal point," denoted
I, such that ;ir(I;) >;r(F) for all F. Moreover, it follows from unconstrained
monotonicity that I; F.
Assume that n is odd and that voting is by simple majority rule. We now verify
the following fundamental proposition:
Median Cutoff Theorem: THE IDEAL POINT OF THE FIRM WITH THE MEDIAN
CUTOFF IN THE INDUSTRY WILL BE PREFERRED TO ANY OTHER QUOTA BY A
MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS.
Suppose there are n voters, where n is an odd integer. Denote the median index
by m(= n). If F < Im, voters 1,2,... , m (a majority) would prefer Im. This
follows since F < Im Fm min(F1, F2 ,... , F_1) and voters partially agree. If
instead F > Im, it will be shown that voters m, m+ 1,... n (a majority) would prefer
Im. Recall that the cutoffs of these firms are no larger than Fm and that I_ < F-
Any i such that FN Im must prefer Im to F > I, (unconstrained monotonicity).
As for any i such that Im < F Fm, he prefers Im to any F E (Im, F] (since
2 1That is, many extensive-form voting games which have payoffs with a Condorcet winner will
result in that outcome being chosen under majority rule. For an example of one such game and also
experimental evidence that the Condorcet winner will be chosen, see Salant and Goodstein [1990].
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preferences partially agree) and Fi to any F > Fi (unconstrained monotonicity).
Hence, he prefers Im to any F > Im (continuity).
Finally, if Im is the unique ideal point of the voter with the median cutoff, then
it will be the unique Condorcet point.
It follows that where our lexicographic indexing turns out to order firms by
marginal cost, the choice of the cartel will be the ideal point of the firm with the
median marginal cost. Similarly, where it orders firms by capacity, the choice of the
cartel will be the ideal point of the firm with the median capacity.
2..2 Our Conditions Compared to Others Sufficient for a Condorcet
Winner
There are many preference restrictions sufficient to guarantee existence of a
Condorcet point. Some, like "single-peakedness" [Black, 1958] apply to individ-
ual preferences. More general conditions restrict the distribution of preferences in
the voting population. The most powerful, "value restriction" [Sen and Pattanaik,
1969], is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Condorcet point. Ob-
viously, our conditions-like any others sufficient for the existence of a Condorcet
point-imply value restriction. Alternatives to value restriction have been sought
because that restriction is difficult to verify.
For example, Epple and Romer [1987], Grandmont [1978], Roberts [1977] and
others have formulated alternative conditions sufficient for the existence of a Con-
dorcet winner within the context of specific models. Rothstein [1990] defines the
concept of "order restriction" and then verifies that the preferences in each of the
foregoing specific models are order-restricted.
Moreover, recently Rothstein [1991] has shown that whenever preferences are
order-restricted, there must exist a "representative voter." A representative voter
is an individual whose preference between any two alternatives coincides with the
preference of a majority of the voters. Clearly, the ideal point of the representative
voter must be a Condorcet winner.
If our conditions implied order-restriction (or more generally the existence of
a representative voter), then the existence of a Condorcet quota would be assured
and our "median cutoff theorem" would be superfluous. As we show, however, our
conditions-nesting of cutoffs, partial (or even complete) agreement, unconstrained
monotonicity, and continuity-do not imply the existence of a representative voter.
Hence, Rothstein's results cannot be used to deduce the existence of a Condorcet
winner from our conditions.
It suffices to consider an example. Assume there are 3 voters with the continuous
preferences represented in Figure 2.
[Figure 2]
Assume the cutoffs are as follows: F1 = 1, F2 = .5, and F3 =- .25. Hence, the cutoffs


















0 0.25=F3 0.5=F2 0.75 1=F1
FIGURE 2
right of his cutoff-satisfying unconstrained monotonicity. It remains to verify from
Figure 2 that any two voters agree between any two alternatives binding on both
of them. Voter 2 and 3 are both constrained to the left of F3 and completely agree
among alternatives in that range. Voter 1 and 3 are both constrained to the left
of F3 and completely agree among alternatives in that range. Voter 1 and 2 are
both constrained to the left of F2 and completely agree among alternatives in that
range. Hence, the preferences display not merely partial but "complete agreement."
It follows from our theorem (and from inspection) that the ideal point of Voter 2
(12 = 0) is the Condorcet winner.
Nonetheless, no voter is representative. Voter 3 is not representative since,
unlike the other voters, he prefers .25 to .5. Voter 1 is not representative since,
unlike the other voters, he prefers 1.0 to .75. It may at first seem surprising that
the voter with the median cutoff, Voter 2, also fails to be "representative." While
he must reflect majority opinion in comparisons between his own ideal point and
any alternative, he does not reflect majority opinion in pairwise comparisons which
exclude his ideal point. For example, Voter 2 is not representative of the majority in
his preference of .75 over .25. Hence, while the preferences satisfy our restrictions,
there is no representative voter. We conclude, therefore, that our median cutoff
theorem differs from the assorted collective choice results in the literature.
2..3 The Economic Effects of Political Changes: Comparative-Statics
As mentioned in the introduction, some cartels permit allfirms subject to quotas
to vote but weight the votes unequally-so-called "weighted majority rule" voting.
Typically, firms with larger "capacity" or larger production in the benchmark year
receive more votes. Other cartels such as U.S. Federal agricultural marketing boards
permit only a subset of regulated firms to vote but the vote of each committee
member is given equal weight. The latter scheme is really a special case of weighted
majority rule with the votes of some regulated firms receiving zero weight.
Weighted majority rule can be represented within our framework by replicating
the preferences of those firms given more than one vote and deleting from consider-
ation the preferences of those firms given zero weight. Since each of the preferences
of the "new set" of voters has the characteristics sufficient for the existence of a
Condorcet quota, existence is assured under weighted majority rule.
Changing the weights assigned to the different voters or, in the extreme case,
zeroing out one subset of voters rather than another changes the identity of the
median voter on the cartel and displaces the political-economic equilibrium. To
determine the comparative-static effects of changing the index of the median voter,
we now show that a firm with a lower index must also have a higher ideal point.
That is, if i < j, then I; ;> 1. For, a quota equal to firm j's ideal point must bind
on firm j (unconstrained monotonicity) and must therefore bind on firm i (nesting
of cutoffs). If I; < I5 were possible, then a quota equal to firm i's ideal point would
also bind on both firms. Since i has the looser of the two cutoffs and must strictly
prefer its own ideal point, partial agreement would require that j also strictly prefer
11
Ii to 17. But since I, is firm j's own ideal point, such a conclusion is absurd. Thus,
Ii ;>I.
The significance of this observation is the following. If a re-weighting scheme
results in the index of the new median voter being smaller, then the committee will
vote for a looser quota and the induced price will decrease. Thus, for example, if
the Secretary of Agriculture were to remove from an agricultural marketing board a
member larger than the median voter and were to replace him with someone smaller
than the median voter then the identity of the median voter would change and-in
the new political-economic equilibrium-the market price would (weakly) decline.
Similarly, if votes were reapportioned in a commodity agreement so that the new
median voter had a lower index, then the committee would select a less restrictive
quota and the market price would decline as a consequence.
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3. Does the Condorcet Quota Maximize Industry Profits?
In this section, we compare the economic equilibrium which arises under major-
ity rule voting with what would occur if F were set to maximize industry profits. In
this comparison, it is important to distinguish the case of identical marginal costs
from the case where costs differ.
3..1 Identical Marginal Costs
Suppose each firm in an industry has the same marginal cost. Then, the aggre-
gate production (denoted Y*) that maximizes industry profits is defined implicitly
as the unique solution to the following first-order condition:
P(Y*) + Y*P'(Y*) - c = 0. (14)
Suppose the cartel were to select the quota F* = Y*/Q,. Then, (14) can be re-
written as:
P(QnF*) + QnF*P'(QnF*) - c = 0. (15)
As long as there is more than one firm subject to regulation, any firm i will have an
individual capacity smaller than the aggregate capacity (q, < Qn) and (15) implies:
P(QnF*) + qjF*P'(QnF*) - c > 0.
It follows that F* would induce every firm in the industry to produce its legal limit.
Hence, F* would result in the monopoly output (Y*).
Since every firm is constrained at F*, the monopoly quota must be (weakly)
smaller than the cutoff of the largest firm (F* < Fn). Indeed, the monopoly quota
must coincide with the ideal point of the largest firm (F* = In). To verify this,
note that firm n strictly prefers its own ideal point to any other quota and, a
fortiori, to any other quota binding on all firms. Furthermore, since with identical
marginal costs all firms rank quotas binding on everyone in the same way (complete
agreement),22 each firm in the industry must prefer In to any other quota binding
on everyone. Industry profit is, therefore, maximized if and only if the ideal point
of the largest firm in the industry is chosen by the cartel.
The monopoly outcome could occur under various circumstances. It would, of
course, occur if the only voter on the cartel were the largest firm in the industry. But
it would also occur if firms were identical, no matter which subset of them voted.
For, then-no matter how infinitesimal the capacity of each firm-the Condorcet
quota would be the common ideal point of the identical firms and would coincide
with the ideal point of the "largest" firm. Homogeneity among firms-not their
absolute size-leads to monopoly profits in this model. Heterogeneity leads to
conflict within the cartel and reduced profits in the voting equilibrium.
Whenever the cartel votes for a quota different from F*, it will select a looser
quota. Indeed, since the firms would unanimously prefer F* to any other quota
binding on everyone, any quota which the voters prefer must exceed the cutoff of
the largest firm (F> F > I = F*). If the monopoly quota is not chosen, therefore,
the resulting equilibrium price must be lower and some firms (firm n and perhaps
others) will produce less than the legal limit. The presence of any firm producing
less than its legal limit constitutes proof, within the context of the identical-cost
case of the model, that industry profits are not being maximized by the cartel.
The welfare implications of these results depend on the interpretation of the
model. Consider the following example. Suppose demand is linear and the industry
22See footnote 17.
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consists of three firms with different capacities but identical marginal costs:
P = 10-Y;
C1 = C2=C3=2
gi = q2=3; but q3=10.
Since costs are identical, industry profit can be expressed as a function of aggregate
production: Y(10 - Y - 2) = Y(8- Y). It is straightforward to verify that the
monopoly output is Y* = 4, the monopoly price is P* = 6, and the maximum
industry profit is 16.
Since aggregate capacity is Q3 = 16, the monopoly outcome can be achieved if
the cartel were to select a quota of F* = Y*/Q3 = 1/4. In that case, the legal limits
for the three firms would be, respectively, q1 = 3/4, Fq 2 = 3/4, and Fq3 = 104.
It is a Nash equilibrium for each firm to produce the maximum it is allowed. or
then the resulting price would be 6 and, as the reader can verify, no firm would
have an incentive to reduce its output. The distribution of the monopoly profits
in this equilibrium would be as follows: r1 = 72 = (6 - 2) -3/4 = 3 while 7r3 =
(6 - 2) 10/4 = 10.
If each firm casts one vote, then firms 1 and 2 would reject the monopoly quota
(and any other alternative) in favor of F = 2/3.23 This quota would induce an
equilibrium with firms 1 and 2 constrained but firm 3 unconstrained. Specifically,
y1 = Y2 = 3 =2. To verify this, note that the resulting price would be 4 and the
respective first-order conditions would be:
4 - 1 -2 - 2 >O0 and y1 is at its upper bound (y1 = 2);
4 - 1- 2 - 2 >0 and y2 is at its upper bound (y2 = 2);
4 - 1- 2 - 2 = 0 and y3 ais unconstrained (y3 = 2 < 10.2/3) .
Hence, neither firm 1 nor firm 2 has an incentive to contract output unilaterally;
and firm 3 has no incentive to change its output unilaterally in either direction.
Compared to the monopoly quota, industry profits fall 25%. But two of the firms
(a majority) are better off: iri = 7r2 = 7r3 = (4-2) -2 = 4. Moreover, the movement
toward the competitive output increases social surplus. The gain of the two smaller
firms plus the gain of the consumers from the lower price exceeds the loss to the
larger firm.
This example can be re-interpreted as applyin to prorationing boards governing
common properties. We will examine two cases. Fn the first, sole ownership achieves
the social optimum while a heterogeneous prorationing board would allow too much
extraction. In the second, a heterogeneous prorationing board achieves the social
optimum while a sole owner would excessively restrain extraction.
Suppose first that the price of oil is fixed exogenously at P = 8 and the aver-
age cost of extracting from any well on a field (A(Y)) depends on the aggregate
extraction (Y) from that field due to a pure congestion externality. In particu-
lar, assume that A(Y) = Y. Suppose three extractors have yardstick capacities of
gi = q2 = 3 and q3 = 10. Then the socially optimal extraction rate maximizes
Y(8 - Y), namely YB. = 4. A sole owner would induce socially optimal extraction. A
23That is, F = 2/3 is the ideal point of the firm with the median capacity (firm 2) and hence is
the Condorcet point. To find the best F for firm 2 among the set of quotas which constrain firms 1
and 2 but not 3, verify that F = 2/3 solves:
max q2 F(1-3F -3F - ya-2)
subject to: 10O-6F -2ys- 2=O0
and that at F = 2/3 only firm 3 is unconstrained.
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board could achieve the social optimum by choosing a quota of F = 1/4. However,
under majority rule such a quota would be rejected in favor of the Condorcet quota
of F = 2/3.,
On the other hand, suppose that a sole owner could influence the price. Then he
would exploit this ability and would extract less than is socially optimal. Since the
voting equilibrium results in more extraction, a prorationing board may be socially
preferable to sole ownership.
To illustrate, suppose that P = 8 - 2/3Y and A(Y) = 1/3Y while the capacity
of each well described above remains unchanged. Then a sole owner would still
maximize Y(P(Y) - A(Y)) = Y(8 - Y) and would again set Y = 4. The committee
could still achieve this output with a quota of 1/4 but would extract Y = 6 by voting
for a quota of F = 2/3 instead. In this modified example, the social optimum is no
longer Y = 4 but is exactly the amount chosen by the prorationing board. To verify
this, note that Y = 6 maximizes fj" P(x)dx - YA(Y) which is net social surplus.
3..2 Different Marginal Costs
When marginal costs differ among firms, full maximization of industry profit
requires that the only firms which produce are those with the lowest marg'nal costs;
the rest shut down. It is not always possible to achieve this outcome wif a quota.
Nonetheless, we can compare the quota that results in the largest industry profits
(the "most profitable" F) to the Condorcet quota. As a separate matter, we can
also compare the price that results when industry profits are fully maximized to the
price associated with the Condorcet quota.
As in the previous subsection, the Condorcet quota may be looser than the
most profitable quota and may in addition result in a lower price than would occur
if industry profit were fully maximized.24 But a new phenomenon may also arise
when marginal costs differ: the quota chosen by the cartel may be more restrictive
than the most profitable quota and, as a result, the price may be higher than would
occur if industry profits were fully maximized. As the following example illustrates,
high-cost firms may use their voting power to restrict the output of firms with lower
costs.
Suppose again that demand is linear and the industry consists of three firms.
Assume now, however, that the firms differ in cost rather than in capacity:
P = 10 - Y;
ci = 2 but c2 = c3 = 6;
1= q2 =q3 = 5.
A profit-maximizing monopolist would shut down firms 2 and 3 and would produce
y1 = 4 with the remaining firm. As a result, the price would be P = 6 and monopoly
profits would be ir1 = 16.
The committee could achieve the same result by setting F = 4/5 since this
would induce an equilibrium with y2 = y3 = 0 and y1 = 4.25 To verify this, note
24To verify this, slightly perturb the first example in the previous subsection so that the marginal
cost of the largest firm differs trivially from that of the other two firms. Continuity assures that the
results will change trivially from before. The cartel will still select a quota which is less restrictive
than the most profitable one; in addition, the price that results from voting will be lower than the
profit-maximizing price.
2sTo construct an example where no quota can fully maximize profits, suppose the marginal cost
of the two high cost firms were instead slightly lower (e.g. c2 = c3 = 5). To mimic the monopoly
solution, the high cost firms must be shut down. This would require a quota larger than F = 4/5;
but any such quota would depress the output of firm 1 below what is required in the monopoly
solution.
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that the price resulting from this quota would be 6 and the respective first-order
conditions for the three firms would be satisfied:
6 - 1 -4/5.- 5 - 2 > 0 and y1 is at its upper bound;
6 - 1-0-6<Oand y2 =0;
6 - 1.0-6<Oandy3 =0.
Hence, neither firm 2 nor firm 3 has an incentive to increase its production unilater-
ally and firm 1 has no incentive to reduce its production unilaterally. Note that in
this equilibrium firms 2 and 3 earn zero - as they would at any looser quota. Firms
2 and 3 will therefore reject this quota in favor of something tighter (unconstrained
monotonicity).
Firms 2 and 3 would reject the most profitable quota (and any other alternative)
in favor of F = 2/15.26 If F = 2/15, all three firms will be constrained at the Cournot
equilibrium. Hence, yi = y2 = y3 = 2/3 and P = 8. 7r2 =7r3 = (8 - 6).- 2/3 = 4/3
while Sri = (8 - 2).- 2/3 = 4. Compared to the most profitable quota, industry
profits fall by 58%. But two of the firms (a majority) are better off. Firms 2 and 3
collectively gain 8/3 but in the process firm 1's profit declines from 16 to 4.
Since in this example the cartel could fully maximize industry profit by using
the most profitable quota, the voting equilibnum results both in a quota which is
more restrictive than the most profifable quota and a price which is higher than
would arise if profits were fully maximized.
261t is straightforward to verify that F = 2/15 is the ideal point of the firm with the median
marginal cost and hence is the Condorcet point. The best F for firm 2 must bind on firm 2 and




As mentioned in the introduction, in many applications only a subset of the
firms in the industry are subject to the cartel's restrictions. Therefore, we conclude
by showing how to adapt the analysis if some firms are unregulated.
Assume some of the n firms in the industry are unregulated. Assume the cartel
selects F by majority rule and then, having observed F, the regulated and unregu-
lated firms choose outputs simultaneously. Suppose F has been chosen. Compare
the Cournot equilibrium when all firms are regulated to the equilibrium when some
of them are unregulated. When a firm ceases to be regulated, its pseudosupply
curve in Figure 1 (a) loses its vertical segment and instead is strictly increasing
throughout. The previous arguments extend to establish the existence of a unique
Cournot equilibrium. In addition, they imply that the profits in that equilibrium
(the so-called "induced preferences") once again display unconstrained monotonic-
ity and continuity in F. Since at any price P the pseudosupply of every unregulated
firm is at least as large as when it was regulated, however, the equilibrium price
associated with a given F must be weakly less than when all firms are regulated.
Hence, since the demand curve slopes down, the aggregate production associated in
the Cournot equilibrium with a given F must be weaky larger than when everyone
is regulated. That is, Y(F) > Y(F), where Y(F) denotes the equilibrium aggregate
production induced by F when the specified set of firms are unregulated. Since
the regularity condition necessary for the nesting of cutoffs involves aggregate pro-
duction, (4) must be modified so that Y(F) is replaced by Y(F). If the regularity
condition holds with this modification, then all of our results continue to hold.
The cutoffs will be nested and the induced preferences will display partial agree-
ment. As a consequence, a Condorcet quota will again exist; moreover the quota
will respond as before to changes in the voting weights. If firms have identical
marginal costs, then when some firms are unregulated the induced production may
exceed the monopoly output (Y(O) > Y*) even with F = 0. In that case,, of course,
the price induced by voting will be strictly smaller than the monopoly price. When
there exists a quota which would induce Y* that quota will again be binding on
every regulated firm and will coincide with the ideal point of the regulated firm
with the largest index. If that quota is not selected the market price will be, as
before, lower than the monopoly price. If firms have different marginal costs, then
as before the price may be either higher or lower than that associated with the most
profitable F. In short, as long as the modified regularity condition holds, none of
our results changes when some of the firms are unregulated.
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Let QN = q, the sum of the exogenous "capacities".
i=1
Let #/(Y) = min max 0,P AP,Y' Fqi for Y E [0, FQN ]. Define #3(Y) =
N
Z/#;(Y). Hence /3(Y) is the "aggregate best reply". Since P(Y) and P'(Y) are
i=1
continuous and P'(Y) < b < 0, /3(Y) is continuous. Moreover as long as P(0) >
ci, /3(0) > 0. Finally, /3(FQN) < FQN. It follows that there exists at least one
fixed point Y* E [0, FQN] such that /3(Y*) = Y*.
Assume that total revenue is strictly concave:
2P'(Y) + YP"(Y) < 0 for all Y E [0, FQN].
Then, 2P'(Y*) + /;(Y*)P"(Y*) < 0 for every Y* E [0, FQN] and each firm's second-
order condition will be satisfied at each fixed point. Hence, every fixed point of the
mapping #(-) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. .
II. Uniqueness.
We now verify that the left and right-hand derivatives of /(-) evaluated at any
fixed point Y* are strictly less than 1. This implies that there exists a unique fixed
point.
If i is unconstrained,
P(Y) - c,
(Y)--P'(Y)
Hence /(Y) = _- P'(Y) ".)P"(Y)". Assume that as Y -> Y* from the right that uR
firms are unconstrained. Summing over these unconstrained firms we obtain:
(Y*)+= - uR + PIY, ) [#(Y*) - FQc]
where Qc is the aggregate capacity of the constrained firms - firms for which
/3(Y*) = Fq, and P(Y*) + 3(Y*)PI(Y*) - c, > 0. Since P'(Y*) < 0 and #(Y) >
FQc, #'(Y*)+ < 0 < 1 provided P"(Y) < 0. It remains to show that #'(Y*)+ <1 if
P"(Y ) > 0.
At any fixed point, 2P'(Y*) + /3;(Y*)P"1(Y*) < 0. Hence, summing over the
unconstrained firms.
2URP'(Y* ) + [#(Y* ) - FQc0 ]P"l(Y* ) < 0.
Recall that 2P'(Y*)+Y*P"(Y*) < 0. Thus 2P'(Y*)[uR+1I+2 {(#(Y*) - 6& P"I(Y*)<
0. Dividing by -2P'(Y*) > 0, we obtain:
-[U+1 j#Y*) 2 1 P'(Y* )<0
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or
{UR + P1(Y*) FQC
P' (Y*) 2
If P"(Y*) > 0 and the foregoing inequality holds, then adding the negative quantity
FQe "Y
2 P'(Y*) to the left-hand side will not reverse the inequality:
( {UR + P, [#( - FQc]} < 1 . (Al)
Hence /'(Y*)+ < 1. Now assume that as Y -+ Y* from the left that uL firms are
unconstrained. Summing over these unconstrained firms, we obtain:
#'(Y* )~= - {UL + p,(y,) [(Y ) - FQc]}
Repeating the same steps as for the right-hand derivative, we obtain:
UL + p(y*) [(Y*) -FQc]j <1 . (A2)
Hence '3(y*)- <1.
It follows that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies induced
by any F. .
Appendix II: Unconstrained Monotonicity and Convexity of the Set of
Quotas Binding on Firm i
Let i be an unconstrained firm with profit
art = [P(Y(F)) - c;] - yi(F) .
A change in F will affect i's profits:
dir- dY (dy;
dF - dF [P(Y(F)) - c +yi(F)P'(Y(F))}
Since i is unconstrained, P(Y(F)) - ct + y;P'(Y(F)) = 0. Substituting this in the
dAr-
expression for , we obtain:
di~ [-y 2P(( F))] ch+iyiP'(Y( F))}
=K-- y;P'(Y(F)) .
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The last factor is strictly negative. Moreover, the factor in braces is strictly positive
since
d y_ P'(Y) + y1P"(Y) 2P'(Y) + yiP"(Y)1- 2. -1 +
dY P'(Y) P'(Y)
Since the demand curve is downward-sloping and the second-order condition of firm
i holds, the last fraction is the ratio of two strictly negative numbers and is therefore
strictly positive.
dici dY
Hence sgny - -sgn--.
dir- dir-
To show that < 0 as long as some firm is constrained (clearly = 0 if no
firm is constrained) we verify that > 0.
Let U be the set of unconstrained firms and u be the number of elements in this
set. For each unconstrained firm i E U
P(Y)+ y;P'(Y) - c, = 0 .
Summing over the set of unconstrained firms and using the fact that E y; = Y-FQc
iEU
we obtain:




dF (u + 1)P'(Y) + (Y - FQc)P"(Y) (
This expression is zero if no firm is constrained. Suppose Qc > 0. The numerator
is negative since demand is downward- sloping. To sign the denominator, note that
equations (Al) and (A2) can be written:
u + [Y - FQc]//Y > -1 (A4)P'(Y)
where Y is the Nash equilibrium total quantity induced by F and u is the number of
firms unconstrained at F. This immediately implies that the denominator of (A3)
is negative, and hence dY/dF > 0.
We can use these results to verify that a firm constrained (unconstrained) at F
will remain constrained (unconstrained) at a tighter (looser) quota. This will be
the case if y;(F), the optimal output for a firm i at any F where it is unconstrained
does not increase faster than the maximum allowable output, q2F, as F increases.
This can be written:
dy, dy, dY [ yP"(Y( F)) + P'(Y( F))]Qc (5
dF -dY dF = (u+1 )P'(Y(F)) + [Y - FQc]P"(Y(F)) -
The denominator is negative by the argument used to establish that dY/ dF > 0.
The numerator is negative if P"(Y(F)) K 0. Suppose instead that P"(Y (F)) > 0.
Substituting Fq, for the smaller value y, in the numerator and rearranging terms
gives the following sufficient condition for (A5):
0 > [(u + l)P'(Y(F)) + YP"(Y(F))] + QcP"(Y(F)). (A6)
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Concavity of total revenue combined with downward-sloping demand imply that,
for every u > 1,
(u + 1)P'(Y) + YP"(Y), (A7)
so the first and second terms on the RHS of expression A6 are negative, and in-
equality A5 is verified.
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